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IN THE SUP'REME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
:'llAln'J;.J R. COX,

.r. R.

L. P.

Plaintiff,

- vs. Bl<~RRY,

Defendant and Third-Party
Plailitiff and Appellant,
- vs. -

~~LAOLE,

JOSEPH ANDERSON,

Case No.
10744

Y!\'L\:\' SCHELLAR, ROBERT GRAi i .'.~I arnl RILEY DRAPER,

Third-Party Defendants
and Respondents.

Appellant's Brief on Appeal
STA1'El\lENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Thi:-; is an artion by plaintiff :Marvin R. Cox to
il'<'<1nr ('<>rtain funds allegedly borrowed by the defendant ,J. H. B<>ny as part of the purchase price for the
i111relim:e of the Homestead Hotel in Wasatch County.
IldPrnlant .T. R. Bt>rry filed a third-party complaint
11 l11'1'1'ill l1P allPged to have been acting in a corporate
"H11a<'it_,. for Zions Investment Corporation, and claimed
1lw1 ii> r<>ason of certain hold harmless agreements be-
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tween himself and the third-party defendants that said
third-party defendants would be liable to him for any
amount found owing to the plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The third-party defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss supported by affidavits. A counter-affidavit was
filed by J. R. Berry in opposition to the Motion to Disrmss. The matter was heard before the Honorable
Stewart 1L Hanson, Judge of the Third Judicial District, and the Motion to Dismiss was granted in the form
o.f a Summary J udgrnent.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the Summary .Judgment of the District Court, and reinstatement of his thirdparty complaint against the third-party defendants.
The issues in this appeal relate solely to the issues
between defendant and third-party plaintiff J. R. Berry
and third-party defendants Li. P. Slagle, Joseph Anderson, Vivian Schellar, Robert Graham and Riley Draper.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Inasmuch as the trial court granted a Summary
Judgment in favor of the respondents, the Supreme
Court is obliged to consider the facts in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the motion is made,
which in this case is the appellant J. R. Berry. Whitrna11
2
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TV. T. GrMit Compmiy, 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 P.2d 918.
In this regard and for the purposes of this appeal, the
fads as alleged in appellant's affidavit must therefore
hc eonsidered as being true. Those facts are as follows
(l{-21):
is.

l. That J.

R. Berry is the defendant and third-party

plaintiff in the above-entitled case.

2. That prior to November 11, 1965, J. R. Berry
1rns president and a member of the board of directors
of Zions Investment Co.rporation, a Utah corporation.
3. That prior to November 11, 1965, Zions Investmen t Corporation had acquired and was operating a
certain property consisting of a resort in Wasatch
County, Utah known as the "Homestead"; that when
tht' I-Io1m"stead property was purchased, J. R. Berry
personally became obligated on various notes and oblig-ations of the corporation in order to raise the neces~ary capital to make this purchase; that in order to
Sf'Clffe the loans, advances, pledges of credit and guarantees which J. R. Berry made to the corporation, the
Homestead }Jroperty was held in the name of J. R.
Beny; that all o.f the parties, including the officers,
di rPctors and stockholders of the corporation recognized
t!H' Homestead property as being the property of the
'orporation, and further recognized and acknowledged
UH· sPenrity interest of J. R. Berry in and to said prop<'rty; that on November 11, 1965, J. R. Berry still claimed
a 1-'<>curity interest in the Homestead property and record
ti tlt> to the property was in his name.
3

4. That in addition to the Homestead propPrty,
prior to November 11, 1965, J. R. Berry personally had
agreed to t,ruarantee other loans and obligations of the
corporation.

5. That prior to November 11, 1965, various con.
flicts, disputes and disagreements arose between .J. R.
Berry and the other directors of the corporation; that
.J. R. Berry was requested to resign as president and
director of the corporation; and that at a duly-called ,
meeting of the board of directors held on November 11,
1965, in which all directors were given notice, and a
quorum was present, including all of the third-party defendants, .J. R. Berry agreed to resign as president and
director of the corporation and to convey to the corporation the Homestead property on the co.ndition that
the third-party defendants personally agree to hold him
harmless from any and all debts and obligations of the
corporation for which he had become personally liable;
that thereupon at said meeting the parties prepared two
copies in longhand of Exhibit 2 attached to defendant's
Third-Party Complaint (R-6); that all of the parties
signed and executed said agreement and that J. R. Berry
retained one copy, and the other executed copy was de·
livered to third-party defendants; that it was never the
intention of any of the ]Jarties that any other directors
sign the agreemmt other than those present at the mePt·
ing of N overnber 11, 1965.
6. 'l1hat following the met>ting of November 11, 19G5,
and prior to tlw conveyanc·p of tlw H ornestead property
to the corporation, all of the parties concludPd that their
4

agre(>1t1ent should be reduced to a more formal instru11wnt, and thus the document attached to defendant's
Tl1ird-Party Complaint as Exhibit 3 (R-6a) was exe<·ntP<l hy the parties on November 17, 1965; that L. P.
Sla1-dP and Vivian Schellar were not present at the meeting of ~ ovember 17, 1965, but that the remaining thirdpart? clefendants represented that they were in fact acting for and on behalf of the two· absent parties, and
tliat it "rnnld be unnecessary for them to sign the instrun1Pnts; that based upon said representation and upon
tliP prior agreement, J. R. Berry delivered to third-party
df·frndants the conveyances to the Homestead property,
tl10reh.Y giving up his security interest; that all of the
third-party defendants did immediately thereafter record
or «ause to be recorded said conveyances.

7. That J. R. Berry further in accordance wit!i the
agTPPrnent, did in fact resign as president and director
nf 7,ions Investment Corporation, and thereafter took
no voice in the control and managem~nt of the co.rporaticm.
8. That the books and records of Zions Investment
('o.rporation show a resolution in the following words:
"Discussion was had on the offer of Mr. Berry,
in thf' best interest of the corporation, to resign
as an officer and director, subject to his being
hPld harmless from any contingent or direct liabilities he incurred while serving in such capacities. Upon motion of Graham, seconded by And<'rson, the following resolution was unanimously
adoptf'd:
HE l'T RESOLVED: That the resignation of
.T ark R. Berry be aceepted, effective immediately,
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and the corporation, and their directors, agree to
fully hold him harmless from any claim of amkind assertf•d against him by reason of his ~
tivities as an officer and director of the corporation, including the several notes and mortgage~
upon which Mr. Berry appears as obligor, tlw
proceeds of which were received by the corporation, and excepting from the said hold harmlt>s~
provision, any and all acts of said Berry for and
on behalf of the corporation determined bv a
court of competent jurisdiction to constitut~ a
willful or intentional violation of law."
That the above resolution is signed by J. R. Berry and
by all of the above-named third-party defendants.
ARGUMI:~NT

POINT I
THE HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
J. R. BERRY AND THE OTHER DIRECTORS OF
THE CORPORATION ARE NOT VOID AS BEING
AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY, NOR DO THEY LACK
LEGAL CONSIDERATION.

The Summary Judgment of the trial court does not
state the ground upon which it is based. Hmvever, the
principal point argued in the trial court involved the
question as to whether the agreements of the directors
to hold J. R. Berry harmless from debts of the corporation were illegal and void because the consideration
therefore, either in whole or in part, was Berry's agref'ment to resign as president and director of the corporation. In appellant's opinion, this is the only point raised
in respondents' motion involving strictly a question of
law. It was successfully urged by the respondents in till'
lffwer court that such an agreement amounts to th!'

6

eqnivalf~nt of a trustee being "bought out of office" and
is contrary to public policy.

Appellant recognizes the general rule cited at §348
Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations, Vol. 2, to the effect
that a eorporate officer may not resign his position of
trust for a pecuniary consideration, and that such an
agr<'cnwnt is illegal and void. Fletcher points out that a
director cannot accept payment for his resignation,
;lf itchcll 1·s. Dilbeck, 10 Cal. 2d 341, 74 P.2d 233; that a
dirPctor cannot resign in consideration of the corporation
promising not to sue on his note given to the corporat io.n, 1'. F. Pagel Lumber Company vs. Webster, 231
\Vis. 222, 285 N.-w. 739; and directors cannot resign en
urnssP and sell stock at an excessive price to permit
looting of the corporation by new officers, Gerde vs.
Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 622. It is submitted by the appellant that the rule of law stated by Fletcher, and the
cases therein cited, do not uphold the position of respondents that an agreemnt merely to hold an officer or
director harmless from an obligation in which the corporation is already the principal obligor is not a pecuniary consideration as that term is used in the cases, nor
is it the type of thing that by nature should be void as
against public policy.
Fletcher at §348, Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corpor11t ir!/ls, Vol. 2, after setting forth the general rule, also
points out types of resignation agreements that are legal
and not objectionable. The last sentence of said paragraph provides as follows:
"\YherP the person advancing the money necessary for working capital demanded that he be
7

elected president, it is proper for the directors
to endeavor to secure the resignation of the prr.
son then president, and the latter may impose as
a condition of his resignation, it seems, that hP
receive the amount owing him by the company
and a reasonable allowance for giving up his salaried position, and that his stock be taken off his
hands."
In Crespinel vs. Color Corporation of America,
Calif., 325 P.2d 565, an agreement to pay a monetary
consideration by the corporation to a resigning offieer
was upheld. The court held that where there is a bona
fide transaction and when it is in the best interest of
the corporation that a director resign, a reasonable allowance may be made for his resignation.
In Joseph vs. Rabb, 81 N.Y.S. 546, it was held lawful for a director to resign for the best interest of the
corporation and to condition his resignation on being
relieved of his stock and paid the amount owing him and
a reasonable allowance for giving up his position.
In Ruffner vs. Sophie Mac Candy Corporation,
Georgia, 132 S.E. 396, it was held that a corporation may
in good faith to serve its best interests, accept the resignation of its director-president, and in consideration
purchase his shares of the corporation at an agn~ed
valuation.
In Mooney 1;s. Overland Willeys Motor Corporation,
204 F.2d 888, a director resigned after a derivative suit
had been instituted against him, and in consideration the
corporation agreed to indemnify him for expenses in
8

connection therewith. It was held in the absence of an
ulterior motive such a contract was enforceable.
At 28 University of Cincinnati Law Review 380, appear8 a case note on the Crespinel case. In that artiele
the author, after analyzing the recent cases, acknowledges
that as a general 111le, any bona fide agreement will be
npheld.
lG-10-J ( o) Utah Code Annotated gives a corporation the power to indemnify directors and officers from
<'xpen8es of litigation arising from their activities while
acting as a corporate officer. If by statute a corporation
can indemnify an officer for litigation expenses, it would
seem that there should be no public policy against a corporation or its directors agreeing to indemnify an officer
from an obligation where the corporation is already the
principal debtor.
~,

In the case before the court, J. R. Berry did not
receive any payment for his resignation. Although he
was a large stockholder, he did not ask that the corporaticm or the remaining directots purchase his stock; he
also had a salaried position with the corporation and
a~ked for nothing as an allowance for giving up his
position. The only thing he bargained for was that the
n•rnaining directors hold him harmless from corporate
obligations, which as a matter of agency law the corporation as principal obligor would be required to do
anyway. The cases cited by Fletcher in support of the
gl'neral rule all seem to involve a detriment to the corporation or its stockholders. Here there is no detriment
9

or loss to the corporation. The corporation is actually
in a better position from the standpoint of its creditors
because of the additional personal guarantees. There
is no evidence that the agreements were made in bad
faith. The directors requested Berry to resign and
agreed to hold him harmless from corporate obligations.
The parties to the agreement were all fully competent
to enter into a contractual obligation, and it would be
unconscionable to permit respondents to now completely
ignore and evade their solemn promises.
POINT II
THE REl\IAINING GROUNDS FOR RESPONDENTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS INVOLVE EITHER FACTUAL
OR IMMATERIAL ISSUES, AND WOULD NOT SUPPORT A JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL.

In their Motion to Dismiss, respondents set forth
several other grounds in support of the motion. These
grounds, for the most part, involve factual questions and
would not be a proper basis for a judgment of dismissal.
Appellant will treat each of these grounds separately.

A.
ation.

Contention that the Agreements Lack Consider-

Respondents have claimed that the hold harmless
agreements are invalid because they lack consideration.
The consideration claimed is (1) Berry's agreement to
resign as an officer and director of the corporation and
(2) Berry's agreement to give up his security interest
in the Homestead property. Appellant submits thal
either of these considerations would support a valid
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contract. As to the agreement to resign, the authorities
are covered under Point I of this brief. As to the giving np of the security interest, respondents have claimed
that because of representations in the corporate prosprctus and otherwise to the effect that the corporation
was the owner of the Homestead property that Berry had
a pre-existing duty to convey the property to the corporation. Berry never has claimed to be the owner of
the Homestead property but claimed to be holding the
titlr only as security for the liabilities he had personally
undertaken for the corporation. His affidavit alleges
that the corporation and all of its officers and directors
acknowledged and recognized his security interest in the
pro1wrty. ·whether J. R. Berry had such a security interest is strictly a question of fact.

Contention that the Hold Harmless Agreements
are Conditional Upon All Dfrectors Signing.
B.

The hold harmless agreements relied upon by J. R.
BPITY consist of three documents. They are (1) the
hand written agreement found at page 6 of the record
herein, ( 2) the corporate resolutions signed by all parties and entered into the minute book of the corporation
as shown at paragraph 8 of Berry's affidavit (R-24),
and (8) the formalized agreement found at page 6-A of
thP rneord herein.
The first two documents referred to above were
hy all of the third-party defendants. The third
(locurnent was signed by three of the five third-party
<1P f t·n<lants.
~ig1wd
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C.J.S. Contracts

~62 sets out the general rulPs

with resped to the required number o.f signatures on a
contract. Beginning at page 735, it is stated as followH:
"'rhe question as to "-hether those who haw
signPd are bound is gPnerally to be determinPd
by the intc>ntion and understanding of the parties at the time of the execution of the instrument.
The reason for holding the instnunent void is that
it was intended that all the parties should execuh·
it and that each executes it on the implied condition that it is to be executed by the others, and,
therefore, that until executed by all it is inchoatP
and incomplete and never takes effect as a valid
contract, and this is especially true where the
agreement expressly provides, or its manifest intent is, that it is not to he binding until signed.
''\'{here these reasons do not apply, it is usually
hPld that a party who signs and delivers an instrument is bound by the obligations therein assumed, although it is not executed hy all of the
parties named in it, as, for example, where all
the parties recognize the validity of the contract
and acquiesce in its perfonnance. Usually, however, a party may, on signing, impose an enforceable condition that the agreement is not to be binding until signed by others.

"It is competent for the parties to adopt a writ-

ten instrument as their contract without signing
it, provided their intention to do so is clear."

Cases cited for thP above rule are as follows:

Kaneko vs. Okuda, 195 C.A. 2d 2J7, 15 Cal. Rptr. 292,
holding that in the absence of showing that contract is
not to be dPemed complete unless signed by all parties.
parties signing may he bonn<l though others have no·t
signed.
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Elick vs. Schiller, Texas, 235 S.W. 2d 494, holding a
contract is binding on those who sign it, in absence of
a showing that signature was obtained by trick or artifice.
Winter vs. Kitto, California, 279 Pac. 1024, holding
that where sufficient consideration for signers agreenwnt is shown from the instrument itself, signer cannot
bP released because other persons failed to sign.
flank of U.S. vs. Chemical Bank & Trust Company,
246 N.Y.S. 595, holding that one signing and delivering
an instrument not signed by all parties intended is bound
unless signer indicates to obligee intent not to be bound
until others sign.
Schlosl)(c;rg vs. Shannan and Luchs Company, D.C.,
5;) A. 2d 722, holding that mere expectation that another
wi 11 sign does not necessarily prevent those signing from
heing hound even though expected party does not sign.
In the instant case, the affidavit of J. R. Berry
~tates that it was not the intention of any of the parties
that any additional parties sign the first two instruments. Again, this involves a question of fact. The evidence ·would show that appellant and third-party defendants were all of the directors present at the meeting
whPre the documents were signed and that there was
no discussion that any other party would sign the same.
l•'urther, the third tn)ewritten document had the names
of tlH· five third-party defendants typed in for signature,
indirating that there was no intent for any additional
c;i1-,111atures.

As to the third instrument, it is true that it was
r·cmtrn1plated that five parties should sign. Whether

13

the three who signed intended to he bound is again a
question of fact. Berry's affidavit alleges that the signern
expressly stated to him that it would be unnecessary for
others to sign. They accepted the instruments conveying
the homestead property and recorded tlwm. It would
seem that after having accepted the benefits of their bargain they cannot now say that they had no intention to
be bound. In any event, either of the first two docunwnts
would impose liability upon all of the third-party defendants even if the third document, which was signed by
only three of the respondents, were a complete legal
nullity.

C. Contention that the Agreements Were Conditional Upon the Corporation Signing the Agreement"

It \Vas contended in respondent's motion to dismiss
that the first agreement, the hand written agrernent, was
not properly executed by the corporation because it was
signed by Joseph Anderson, Secretary. The signature
line does not say Secretary of what. This contention is
completely without merit. Mr. Anderson signed thr
agreement in two place8 - .JilCe for himself personally
and once as sccertary for the corporation. The agreement refers to Zions Investment Corporation so there
can be no misunderstanding as to what corporation signed
the agreement. Mr. Anderso.n, as shown by his affidavit,
also is in fact the secretary of Zions Investment Corporation. The only possible interpretation is that Mr
Anderson signed the agreement for himself and for
Zions Investment Corporation. Even if the corporation
had not signed this agn~ement, it would be immaterial
as to tlw liability of thP third-party dPfendants. Thi~
14

is so (l) because of the same reasons and authorities
l'ited nnder Point II B. of this brief and (2) the corporntion, as principal obligor, would be liable to Berry anywa~T for obligations of the corporation which Berry p€rsonally guaranteed.

D.

Contention that Berry Did Not Resign.

Hespondents claims that the hold harmless agreement was invalid because Berry did not resign his office
as President and Director of the corporation. This is
rlrarly a factual matter. Berry's affidavit states that he
did resign. There is also a corporate resolution signed
by all of the parties accepting the resignation.
According to §346 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations,
Vol. 2, the resignation of an officer is a factual question
and all that need be shown is something evidencing a
clf;ar intent to resign. Further, the resignation need not
takP place at a regular corporate meeting.

Contention that the Meeting of November 11
Whcrrin The First Hold Harmless Agreement Was
ifigncil Was Not a Valid Meeting.
Respondents have contended that the corporate meeting of November 11 wherein the first hold harmless agree11wn t was signed was not a valid meeting because the
noticPs of the meeting were two days late in getting out.
Whether or not the meeting was proper is not even
a matPrial fact in this case. Appellant's theory is that
tl1" third-party defendants are liable on a personal agree11wnt. The corporation was already liable as a simple
inn t1 <'l' of agPnc·y law.
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Appellant is unaware of any principle of law that
would require a formal directors meeting to bind an individual, not the corporation, to a contract.

F.

Contention That The Agreements Lack Delivery.

This contention merely concerned the fact that appellant failed to allege delivery of the instruments in
his complaint. The trial court at the time of hearing
permitted an amendment by interlineation so this point
1s no longer involved on appeal.

G.

Contention That The Agreement is Void Be-

cause of Uncertainty.

The first agreement between the parties purports
to indemnify Berry for "all activities which I participated in while President and Director o.f the Corporation, excepting embezzlement." AppPllant contends that
there is nothing vague or ambiguous about the word
"all." However, even if there were an ambiguity or uncertainty, the court is not involved with the question of
statutory intPrpretation. If ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is generall;.' permissible in interpreting contracts.
This is a case where the legal maxim id certurn est qnod
certurn reddi votest (that is certain which can be made
certain) is applicable. See Am. Jitr. 2d Contracts 077.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon all of the foregoing authorities, appellant respectfully submits that the summary judgment of
the trial court dismissing defendant's third party complaint be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
THOMAS, ARMSTRONG,
RAWLINGS & WEST
By David E. West
Attorneys for Deferi,dant and
Third-Party Plaintiff and
Appellant
1300 vV alker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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